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COMMON CAUSE FAILURES
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are dependent failures of (usually) redundant 
items not otherwise accounted for in a probabilistic risk model. Common cause 
failures can be due to many factors, including:
• Environmental factors (vibration, thermal stress, humidity, etc.)
• Manufacturing defects
• Human error (installation error, improper maintenance, etc.)
• Design error
CCFs are not the same as single point failures (e.g., power supply fails causes a 
loss of three computers)
Examples of CCF from Shuttle:
• Engine Cut-Off Sensors – Common cause dual and triple failures of the sensors 
caused multiple launch scrubs
• PICs – Ten failures on a single mission
• RCS Thrusters – Five instances of two thruster failures on the same mission, and 
one instance of three failures
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COMMON CAUSE MODELS
See NUREG/CR5485 for details about CCF modeling.
• Beta
• Assumes common cause will fail every item
• Is easiest to model
• Is usually used as a placeholder or screening value
• Alpha
• Allows two failures, three failures, etc.
• Modeler must explicitly model all common cause groups
• Best model for small groups (which is usually the case)
• Multiple Greek Letter
• Equivalent to Alpha Model
• Global Alpha
• Uses Alpha model parameters and logic—combines all CCFs into one event
• Pro: Does not require modeler to explicitly model all common cause groups
• Con: Does not include common-cause/independent cross products
(Cross products are almost always negligible)
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COMMON CAUSE MODEL INPUTS
Inputs to common cause models include:
• Group size
• Failure tolerance (e.g., at least 2-of-3 required for success)
• Demand or rate
• Staggered or non-staggered
• Staggered: Units can be removed or isolated individually—lower CCF risk
• Non-Staggered: Units are installed and operated as a group—higher CCF risk
• Parameter values* (e.g., alpha factors)
• Number of critical combinations
• Basic event failure probability
It is unlikely that there will be sufficient data available to estimate common cause 
parameters.  Suppose the failure rate of each item in a dual system is 1.0E-6 and CCF is 
about 3%.  Then the common cause probability is:
(1.0E-6)(0.03) = 3.0E-8
To accurately ascertain that the common cause probability is 3%, this 3.0E-8 event 
would need to be observed several times.  For this reason, generic values are usually 
used for the common cause model parameters.
*NUREG/CR-5496 (2012) is a good reference for generic common cause parameter values. 4
ALPHA FACTORS
5
NUREG/CR-5496 Rev. 2012 provides alpha factors for specific component types 
(pumps, valves, etc.) as well as generic values.  Features of the generic values 
include:
• Different values for demand versus rate
• Group sizes ranging from two to eight
• Uncertainty parameters (beta distribution)
Regression is used to obtain means and variances for groups of eight or more.
COMBINATORICS
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Refresher:
The number of ways, c to select r items from a group of n (without replacement) is:
where
For example, the number of ways to choose two or more items from A, B, C is:
The four combinations are AB, AC, BC, and ABC.
For a group of size 18 the number of combinations of size two or more is 262,125.
This is too many to explicitly model—a global model fixes this.
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tQ  the total failure rate for a given unit (includes independent and common cause contributions) 
k  proportion of failures that result in a group of size k 
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kc  the number of combinations resulting in system failure involving a group of k failures  
  mkQ  the probability of system failure for a given group of k failures of a system of size m 
  mkQ  the total probability of system failure for all groups of k failures of a system of size m 
sQ  the total probability of system failure due to common cause (includes all potential values of k) 
 
The total system CCF failure probability is: 
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The total CCF failure probability for each value of k is: 
The difference between the two 
models is the values for pk and k.
(Equations for the Multiple Greek Letter 
model are similar and can be found in 
NUREG/CR-5485 starting on page A-11 
and the Beta model on page A-20.)
EQUATIONS FOR GLOBAL ALPHA MODEL
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ISS VISITING VEHICLE PROPULSION SYSTEM
An additional challenge with this visiting vehicle is that not all thruster failure groups 
of a certain size are critical.  Failure of a certain number of thrusters out of 18 will 
fail the system only if they occur in specific combinations.  
In the configuration shown, 18 thrusters are arranged in four quadrants.
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OK
Abort
Collision
ISS VISITING VEHICLE PROPULSION SYSTEM
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COMBINATORIAL FAILURE LOGIC
Let k equal the number of thruster failures that have occurred.
Consider the critical combinations that lead to Collision (at least one failure in each 
of the four quadrants).
When k = 0,1,2,3 there will be no Collision.  When k = 4, the result is Collision only 
if the failures occur in different quadrants. The total number of Collision failure 
groups when k = 4 can be calculated as follows: 
Choose both groups of five and
choose one member from each group,
and choose both groups of four and
choose one member from each group:  
When k = 5, one group must contain 2 failures and the remaining groups must each 
have 1 failure.  The group with 2 failures can be of size 4 or size 5:
…it gets complicated pretty quickly.
2 2
2 2 5 4
400
2 2 1 1
     
     
     
10
2 2
2 5 5 2 4 2 4 4 2 5
1,600 1,200 2,800
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
           
              
           
2 failures in a 5 group 2 failures in a 4 group
BRUTE FORCE FAILURE LOGIC
A faster way to count critical combinations is to generate each of 218 = 262,144 
possible failure combinations and check for criticality.  We call this the Brute Force 
Method.  The figure below is a sample of 10 of these. 
The combinations are generated one row at a time and then checked.  Critical 
combinations are counted, and non-critical combinations are discarded.
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COMBINATORIAL FAILURE LOGIC
The number of critical combinations for each number of failures requires a similar 
but increasingly complicated combinatorial argument.
12
GLOBAL ALPHA MODEL
Once the critical combinations have been calculated, the Global Alpha Model is applied 
to calculate the global common cause contribution of the propulsion system to the end 
states Abort and Collision.
The Global Alpha Model Uncertainty Tool (GAMUT) is a spreadsheet tool created by 
NASA S&MA that contains generic alpha values for groups of size two to 32 and makes 
the Global Alpha Model easier to implement.  Values for groups greater than six are 
extrapolated from NUREG/CR-5496 (2012) using regression. 
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k
System 
 Status
c k  k Var( k )
Mean Variance
Group Size 18 1 OK 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.77E-01 6.2E-05 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 LOC LOM
LOM Minimum LOC Only 2 OK 0.0E+00 1.7E+01 9.7E-03 2.9E-05 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 Global Alpha, A 5.5E-02 0.0E+00
LOC Minimum 4 3 OK 0.0E+00 1.4E+02 5.3E-03 1.4E-05 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 Variance 1.7E-03 0.0E+00
Demand or Rate? Demand 4 LOC 4.0E+02 6.8E+02 2.9E-03 9.2E-06 6.5E-03 4.5E-05 5th 7.7E-03 -----
Staggered? Non-Staggered 5 LOC 2.8E+03 2.4E+03 1.6E-03 6.2E-06 9.1E-03 1.9E-04 Median 4.5E-02 -----
6 LOC 9.7E+03 6.2E+03 9.3E-04 3.2E-06 8.3E-03 2.5E-04 95th 1.4E-01 -----
7 LOC 2.2E+04 1.2E+04 5.5E-04 1.1E-06 6.4E-03 1.5E-04 Beta Parameter a 1.6E+00 -----
8 LOC 3.5E+04 1.9E+04 3.4E-04 3.5E-07 4.7E-03 6.6E-05 Beta Parameter b 2.8E+01 -----
Input Notes: 9 LOC 4.3E+04 2.4E+04 2.3E-04 6.8E-07 3.4E-03 1.5E-04 Error Factor 3.0 -----
10 LOC 4.1E+04 2.4E+04 1.7E-04 5.0E-07 2.7E-03 1.3E-04 t
11 LOC 3.1E+04 1.9E+04 1.3E-04 4.0E-07 2.2E-03 1.1E-04
12 LOC 1.8E+04 1.2E+04 1.2E-04 3.5E-07 1.9E-03 9.7E-05
13 LOC 8.5E+03 6.2E+03 1.1E-04 3.2E-07 1.8E-03 9.1E-05 Mean
14 LOC 3.1E+03 2.4E+03 1.0E-04 3.0E-07 1.7E-03 8.7E-05 Variance
15 LOC 8.2E+02 6.8E+02 9.8E-05 2.9E-07 1.7E-03 8.4E-05 Beta Parameter a
16 LOC 1.5E+02 1.4E+02 9.6E-05 2.9E-07 1.6E-03 8.3E-05 Beta Parameter b
17 LOC 1.8E+01 1.7E+01 9.5E-05 2.9E-07 1.6E-03 8.2E-05
18 LOC 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.5E-05 2.9E-07 1.6E-03 8.2E-05
5.5E-05
For groups less than size eight, the 
demand and rate parameters are 
taken directly from the 2012 update 
to NUREG/CR-5496.
For groups greater than size eight, 
the demand and rate parameters 
are identical and are extrapolations 
of the 2010 values.
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GLOBAL ALPHA MODEL RESULTS
The results shown below represent the global common cause contribution of 
this propulsion system.  The common cause event should have a Beta 
distribution, and the values required are the Mean and Beta Parameter b.  The 
common cause event needs to be multiplied by the independent failure 
probability using a compound event. 
That is, 29% of all independent thruster failures are expected to be part of a 
common cause group that will result in system Abort and 5.5% of all 
independent thruster failures are expected to be part of a common cause group 
that will result in Collision.
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MODELING CONSIDERATIONS
Common Cause failures of the ISS Visiting Vehicle thrusters were previously 
modeled using a Beta Model.  The Beta Model assumes that any common 
cause failure results in the failure of every member of the group, so it cannot be 
used to assess the likelihood of Abort.
The generic beta screening value that was used was 1.1E-01 (11%).  This was 
believed to be conservative.
However, the ISS Visiting Vehicle thrusters comprise a very large group that 
can fail with as few as two failures.  When k = 2, there are        = 153 possible 
combinations of two failures, of which 121 are critical (resulting in Abort).  
The fraction of failures that are groups of size k = 2 in a group of size 18 is 
1.3E-01 (using generic alpha parameters from NUREG/CR-5496).  This is 
already larger than the beta screening value of 1.1E-01, and is only for a group 
of size two; the end result includes common cause failure groups of all sizes.
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CONCLUSION
The methodology described here has been used to model common cause of 
thrusters and valves on the following systems:
• All ISS Visiting Vehicles, including Shuttle
• Russian Service Module (SM) thrusters
• Beta Gimbal Assemblies (BGAs)
• Low-Impact Docking System (LIDS)
• Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM) power feeds
• Functional Cargo Block (FGB) power feeds
The Global Alpha Model is the recommended common cause methodology for 
any system with a large number of similar redundant components, particularly 
when specific failure combinations are required to fail the system.  
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BACKUP
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Consider a system of three units where two of three are required for success.
Suppose the system has operated 100 times with eight of the trials resulting in failure
events.
The total failure probability, Qt is:
The corresponding alpha factors are:
The value for alpha-total is:
The values for pi are:
System Attempts 100
Single Failure Events 5
Double CCF Events 2
Triple CCF Events 1
1
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COMMON CAUSE EXAMPLE
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The system total, Qs is:
   3 3
2 3sQ Q Q 
The system total for the non-staggered configuration is:
3 31 1
0.333 0.04 0.250 0.04 0.03
3 1 3 12 3
2 1 3 1
Non
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The system total for the staggered configuration is:
3 31 1
0.250 0.04 0.125 0.04 0.02
3 1 3 12 3
2 1 3 1
Stag
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Common cause models require the assumption of either a staggered or a non-staggered 
system.  In a staggered system, individual units can be tested and replaced as needed.  
In a non-staggered system, the items are installed and operated as a group; individual 
units cannot be isolated from the system and tested. 
The staggered configuration results in a lower common cause value, as expected.
COMMON CAUSE EXAMPLE
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